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CONSTITUTIONAL AND OTHER LIMITATIONS
ON ILLINOIS ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
Samuel Micon*
DMINISTRATIVE law is well recognized today as an important
A branch of our system of jurisprudence. A host of special
agencies have been created to assist in the enforcement of that
field of law. A marked departure has occurred from the common-
law method of disposing of private disputes through judicial ac-
tion, but the administrative branch has been developed and even
accelerated under judicial guidance. In recent years, much of the
analytical and descriptive writing about the development of the
administrative process has been concentrated upon the federal
regulatory authorities and the decisions of the federal courts.
Little has been written concerning the work of state agencies
under state court supervision. For that reason it is proposed to
review the decisions of the Illinois courts regarding the functions,
powers and limitations of the administrative agencies of the state,
particularly as the same may involve aspects of constitutionality,
and to describe the present status of administrative law as it
exists in this state.
I. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE
In constitutional theory, the governmental powers of the state
are supposed to be divided among three distinct divisions, namely
the legislative, the executive, and the judicial.' All lesser bodies,
including the administrative agencies, should, under the same
theory, be also susceptible of classification under the same three
heads. In practical application, however, the courts have been
compelled to observe that the line of demarcation between the
exclusive powers of the three departments is far from clear. In
the same way, many administrative agencies are frequently
charged with duties that partake of the character of all three de-
* Member, Illinois Bar.
1 I11. Const. 1870, Art. III. Substantially the same idea was expressed in Ill.
Const. 1818, Art. I, and in Ill. Const. 1848, Art. II.
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partments although such duties, in all strictness, cannot be classed
as belonging to either.
A single illustration should suffice to demonstrate this fact.
Taxing officials of the many municipal subdivisions of the state
are authorized to levy and apportion taxes. In the performance
of that duty they must first determine what taxes shall be levied;
second; evaluate the property to be assessed; and third, apportion
the total tax between the several items of property. The first of
these duties is, intrinsically, legislative in nature; the second,
judicial; while the third calls for the exercise of executive func-
tions. If the work of the state is to be performed in a prompt and
efficient fashion, too rigid an insistence on the doctrine of separa-
tion of powers would defeat that end for it would only serve to
multiply the number of functionaries and add confusion. In the
interest of efficiency, therefore, a mingling of such powers in one
agency has been -tolerated despite the apparent constitutional
dogma against that practice.
A. JUDICIAL POWER
Very often, administrative and executive officers are called
upon, in the performance of their duties, to exercise judgment
and discretion and to investigate, deliberate and decide. In such
respects, their work closely approximates the function performed
by the courts, yet it has been held that such officials do not ex-
ercise judicial power within the meaning of that term as used in
the Illinois constitution. Just where the dividing line is to be
drawn between legislative, executive and judicial powers with
respect to certain subjects often presents questions about which
enlightened courts and eminent jurists differ widely.2 So long
2 In the early case of Field v. People, 3 Ill. (2 Scam.) 79 at 83-4 (1839), the
court, when speaking of the doctrine of separation of powers, said: "It does not
mean that the legislative, executive, and judicial power should be kept so entirely
separate and distinct as to have no connection or dependence . . . its true mean-,
ing . . . is . . . the whole power . . . shall not be lodged in the same hands,
whether of one or many. . . . In every [government], there is a theoretical or
practical recognition of this maxim, and at the same time a blending and ad-
mixture of different powers." See also Devine v. Brunswick-Balke Co., 270 11l.
504, 110 N. E. 780 (1915); People v. Simon, 176 Ill. 165, 52 N. E. 910 (1898) ;
People v. Bartels, 138 Ill. 322, 27 N. E. 1091 (1891) ; Owners of Lands v. People,
113 Ill. 296.(1885).
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as such officials do not, in fact, assume to perform the actual
functions of the courts there is a definite tendency to hold that
the delegation of authority to them does not violate constitu-
tional restraints. For that reason, whenever a statute, by words
or implication, commits to any such officer the duty to look into
the facts and act upon them, not altogether in a way which the
statute specifically directs but rather after a discretion which is
essentially judicial in nature, the function so performed is
termed "quasi-judicial." 3
The prefix "quasi" is a Latin word frequently used in civil
law and signifies that the thing described by the word has some
of the legal attributes denoted by the legal term but that it has
not all of them. It is synonymous with the phrase "as if" or
"almost" and to the lawyer means "not exactly." It indicates
a resemblance, but it supposes a small difference between the
two objects. "Quasi-judicial," therefore, is a term used to
designate acts presumed to be the product of judgment based on
evidence, either oral or visual or both, which acts lie midway be-
tween the purely judicial and the purely ministerial.4
If the administrative agency performs only quasi-judicial
acts, then, no violation of the constitutional doctrine of separa-
tion of powers has occurred. The Illinois law abounds with
many such instances of which the following are but illustrations.
The act of a clerk of a court in approving a- bond ;5 or an assessor
cr the like when equalizing or assessing property; 6 or a super-
3 Illustrations of the use of that term may be found in Cemetery Association v.
.Iurphy, 383 Ill. 301, 50 N. E. (2d) 582 (1943) ; Nega v. Chicago Railways Co., 317
[11. 482, 148 N. E. 250 (1925); Bagdonas v. Liberty Land & Invest. Co., 309 Ill.
L03, 140 N. E. 49 (1923); People v. Orvis, 301 Ill. 350, 133 N. E. 787 (1922);
Jhicago v. Washingtonian Home, 289 Il. 206, 124 N. E. 416 (1919) ; Mitchell v.
Lowden, 288 Il. 327, 123 N. E. 566 (1919) ; Witter v. Cook County Comrs., 256
[11. 616, 100 N. E. 148 (1912) ; State v. Ill. Central R. R. Co., 246 Ill. 188 at 231,
)2 N. E. 814 at 833 (1910).
4 Devine v. Brunswick-Balke Co., 270 Ill. 504 at 510, 110 N. E. 780 at 782 (1915).
5 People v. Percells, 8 fli. (3 Gil.) 59 (1846) ; Hawthorn v. People, 109 Ill. 302
(1883).
6 People v. Orvis, 301 Ill. 350, 133 N. E. 787 (1922) ; Owners of Lands v. People,
[13 Ill. 296 (1885); Lake v. City of Decatur, 91 II. 596 (1879) ; People ex rel.
Dunham v. Morgan, 90 Ill. 558 (1878) ; Porter v. P. R. I. & St. L. R. R. Co., 76
[11. 561 (1875) ; Spencer & Gardner v. People, 68 Ill. 510 (1873) ; Rich v. City of
Jhicago, 59 Ill. 286 (1871); Wright v. City of Chicago, 48 Ill. 285 (1868) ; People
r. Supervisors, 47 Ill. 256 (1868).
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intendent of schools in passing on appeals taken from the action
of a school board ;7 or the final determination of a department of
public works and buildings ;8 that of a recorder in taking and ap-
proving a bond;9 or a city council in granting or revoking a
dram-shop license;1° or a school superintendent when granting
or revoking a teacher's certificate" have all been treated as being
merely quasi-judicial acts. So, too, is the conduct of a fish com-
missioner in granting a permit to take fish for propagation at
times and by means otherwise prohibited, 2 while the work of a
coroner and coroner's juries, 8 of commerce commissions,1 4 in.
dustrial commissions,15 unemployment boards, 16 retail sales tax
boards, 17 and many others' s is so well understood to be quasi-
judicial as to call for no further comment. So long as the work
of each is subject to judicial review of some sort or another,
the result has been to hold that no violation of the separation
of powers doctrine has occurred nor has the legislature attempted,
in unconstitutional fashion, to interfere with the function of
the judicial department.
B. LEGISLATIVE POWER.
It is equally fundamental that the power to make laws for
a state is vested in the state legislature and is a sovereign power
of such nature, requiring the exercise of judgment and discre-
tion, that it cannot properly be delegated away. The legislature
can authorize others to execute the laws it adopts for it cannot
7 Board of Education v. Board of Education, 314 Ill. 83, 145 N. E. 169 (1924).
8 Chicago v. Washingtonian Home, 289 Ill. 206, 124 N. E. 416 (1919).
9 Hawthorn v. People, 109 I1. 302 (1883).
10 Meyers v. Baker, 120 Ill. 567, 12 N. E. 79 (1887).
"1 People v. Flanlngam, 347 I1. 328, 179 N. E. 823 (1932).
12 People v. Brooks, 101 Mich. 98, 59 N. W. 444 (1894).
13 Devine v. Brunswick-Balke Co., 270 Ill. 504, 110 N. E. 780 (1915).
14 People v. C., I. & L. Ry. Co., 223 I1. 581, 79 N. E. 144 (1906).
15 Nega v. Chicago Railways Co., 317 Ii. 482, 148 N. E. 250 (1925); Grand
Trunk West. Ry. v. Indus. Com., 291 Ill. 167, 125 N. E. 748 (1920).
le Cemetery Association v. Murphy, 383 Iii. 301, 50 N. E. (2d) 582 (1943).
17 Department of Finance v. Cohen, 369 Ill. 510, 17 N. E. (2d) 327 (1938) ; Win-
ter v. Barrett, 352 I1. 441, 186 N. E. 113 (1933).
is See, for example, Investors Syndicate v. Hughes, 378 Ill. 413, 38 N. E. (2d)
'754 (1942) ; Milstead v. Boone, 301 Il. 213, 133 N. E. 679 (1922).
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always understandingly or advantageously do so itself and, from
a practical. standpoint, there must be authority in some one to
see that the laws enacted are enforced. Such task is often
placed on administrative agencies, but again there is no viola-
tion of the constitution for the power to make a law' and the
enforcement thereof represent two different functions. The
former cannot be delegated while the latter may. Therein lies
the true distinction between legislative and administrative func-
tions.
A review of the decisions in Illinois indicates that the courts
have long recognized and repeatedly applied this distinction whel,
asked to test the validity of statutes delegating authority to ad-
ministrative bodies. Where the law is reasonably complete and
merely requires enforcement, albeit with some exercise of dis-
cretion on the part of the administrative official, the same has
been upheld. If, however, it is lacking in detail so that the
official must virtually write the law before he can enforce it, then
an unconstitutional attempt to delegate legislative authority has
occurred.
An illustration of the former may be found in a case in-
volving a municipal ordinance which required the installation
of sprinkler systems in certain types of buildings. The ordi-
nance did not require that any particular system be used but
did provide, as a safety measure, that the plan be approved by
the chief of the fire prevention bureau before installation took
place. Such was not regarded as an unconstitutional delegation
of authority. 19 In another case, that of Arms v. Ayer,20 a factory
inspector was to determine how many fire escapes were required
and in what position the same should be placed on a factory
building. That delegation of discretion was not deemed im-
proper in view of the fact that the statute required fire escape:,
on all buildings four or more stories in height and even on build-
ings of two or more stories when used for certain designated pur-
19 Chicago v. Washingtonian Home, 289 111. 206, 124 N. E. 416 (1919).
20 192 Ill. 601, 61 N. E. 851 (1901).
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poses. As the general policy of the law had been adequately
stated, a filling in of administrative detail was not deemed im-
proper.
Again, the grant of authority to a commissioner of public
works to approve a drip-pan or other device to prevent the spilling
of oil on municipal streets was -upheld in Spiegler v. City of
Chicago2l since the ordinance in question regulated the hauling
of oil in tank wagons and required all such wagons to be so
equipped. The function of the official was treated as pertaining
solely to enforcement and not regarded as legislative in character.
In City of Pekin v. Industrial Commission,22 the ordinance di-
rected that bridge tenders should be under the supervision of
the bridge committee of the city council which committee should
prescribe rules regulating employment and fixing hours of work.
Delegation of that much authority to the committee was not
regarded an objectionable as the duties of bridge tenders were
sufficiently specified in the ordinance, hence the committee was
not obliged to exercise the full legislative function. Perhaps
even broader was the grant of authority to be found in Block v.
City of Chicago23 where an ordinance required a permit for the
exhibition of motion pictures and directed the chief of police not
to issue such permit in case the film was "immoral or obscene."
No other criterion was provided, but the court found the delega-
tion proper on the ground that no better definition could be
formulated than the words used in the ordinance.
On the other hand, the Illinois courts have not hesitated to
hold certain statutes and ordinances unconstitutional because in-
volving an undue delegation of legislative power to administra-
tive officers. Perhaps the clearest illustration is provided by the
case of People ex rel. Gamber v. Sholem24 in which the statute
authorized the fire marshal to order conditions remedied when.-
ever he should find any building or structure in want of proper
21 216 Ill. 114, 74 N. E. 718 (1905).'
22341 Ill. 312, 173 N. E. 339 (1930).
23239 Ill. 251, 87 N. E. 1011 (1909).
24 294 Ill. 204, 128 N. E. 377 (1920).
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repair, specially liable to fire by reason of age, dilapidated con-
dition, or any other, cause, or was "so situated as to endanger
other buildings or property, or so occupied that fire would en-
danger persons or property therein." ' 25  The act was declared
unconstitutional because of the degree of delegation of the legis-
lative function. In that regard, the court said:
In the present instance the section in question lays down no
rule by which the fire marshal is to determine when a build-
ing is especially liable to fire. It may be "for want of
proper repair." What is proper repair is entirely within the
discretion of the fire marshal. It may be "by reason of age
and dilapidated condition." What shall constitute age and
dilapidated condition is wholly within the discretion of the
fire marshal. It may be "or for any cause," leaving to the
fire marshal complete arbitrary powers to nominate the
cause and determine its effect on any building .... By this
act the fire marshal is given the power arbitrarily to deter-
mine, without the intervention or assistance of a court or
jury, where the line of demarkation is in any case. 26
In another instance, that of City of Chicago v. Matthies,27
an ordinance provided, in general terms, for the type of con-
struction to be used in various kinds of buildings and forbade
change in use from one kind to another without the consent of
the building commissioner. The defendant was prosecuted for
converting his building into a rooming house without first ob-
taining a permit. He claimed that the ordinance was uncon-
stitutional because it left to the building commissioner the func-
tion of determining the meaning of the term "rooming house."
The contention was sustained when the court observed:
The city council, under the powers granted to it by the legis-
lature, has authority to define a rooming house, and before
that body imposes restrictions upon the use of a rooming
2r5 Laws 1909, p. 269, § 9.
26 294 Il. 204 at 209-11, 128 N. E. 377 at 379.
27 320 Il1. 352, 151 N. E. 248 (1926).
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house it is necessary either that the term be so generally
understood as to need no definition or the ordinance must
define it. . . . An ordinance which leaves to an executive
officer the definition of the thing to which such ordinance
applies, such definition not being commonly known, is an un-
warranted and void delegation of legislative power to an
executive officer. 28
Other instances of lack of adequate definition may be found
in situations where, for example, a bond "with terms and in
form to be approved by the Secretary of State," was required of
security dealers ;29 a county superintendent of schools was given
discretion to determine what was necessary to form a "satis-
factory and efficient" high school district;3° a zoning board of
appeals had authority to permit changes to correct "practical
difficulties or unnecessary hardships" produced by the zoning
law;31 or a commissioner of public works was left to decide
whether a certain driveway would "unduly obstruct public travel
or be dangerous to the public.' '32 The generality of language
used in each instance was regarded as objectionable because the
legislative body had failed to define the objects to which the law
applied.
Even more clearly offensive to constitutional requirements
are unlimited grants of authority to be exercised as if by whim
or caprice. In City of Sullivan v. Cloe,3 3 for example, an ordi-
nance was declared invalid which forbade the erection of poles
or wires upon municipal streets or alleys without permission
from a designated source but failed to specify the conditions upon
which permiss'on should be granted or to prescribe rules to
guide the administrators of the ordinance in granting or refus-
28 320 Il. 352 at 355, 151 N. E. 248 at 249.
29 People v. Beekman & Co., 347 Ill. 92, 179 N. E. 435 (1932).
10 Kenyon v. Moore, 287 Il. 233, 122 N. E. 548 (1919). See also Jackson v.
Blair, 298 Ill. 605, 132 N. E. 221 (1921).
31 Welton v. Hamilton, 344 Ill. 82, 176 N. E. 333 (1931).
'32 Lydy v. City of Chicago, 356 Ill. 230, 190 N. E. 273 (1934).
3 277 Ill. 56, 115 N. E. 135 (1917).
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ing permits.14  The fact that the administrative official has ex-
ercised such discretion within what would have been permissible
limits if the same had been adequately stated will not serve to
save the statute or ordinance, for it is essential under our con-
stitutional system not only that the laws be clear and certain but
that they emanate from a proper source.
It may be said, therefore, that the Illinois courts have ad-
hered to the well-established doctrine that for the administrative
statute to be constitutional it must not involve a delegation of
legislative authority but that no such violation occurs where the
law establishes a precise system with adequate, definition of the
objects to which the act shall apply.
C. SUFFICIENCY OF STANDARDS.
The legislature, in keeping with such constitutional require-
ments, has enacted many statutes through which it has attempted
to provide reasonable standards to guide administrative agencies
in the performance of their executive duties, so that every person
affected might know what his rights and duties were.
Wherever such standards, definitions and limitations have
been explicit and comprehensive, all such statutes have been sus-
tained even though the terminology used may have been given
no special elaboration. Certain phrases have come to possess a
well-established meaning so that more precise definition has be-
come unnecessary. The use thereof, consequently, has been re-
garded as sufficient in many instances.8 5 For example, in People
ex rel. Odell v. Flaningam'" authority in an examining board to
determine whether an applicant possessed "good .moral char-
34 In People v. Yonker. 351 Ill. 139, 184 N. E. 228 (1933), a statute was held
unconstitutional which vested a city clerk with power to grant or refuse licenses,
to conduct sales of various kinds for lack of definition of the object to which
the act applied.
35 Conversely, terms of technical or special meaning not well enough known to
permit general compliance therewith in the absence of express definition will be
insufficient: Vallat v. Radium Dial Co., 360 Ill. 407, 196 N. E. 485 (1935) ; Mayhew
v. Nelson, 346 Ill. 381, 178 N. E. 921 (1931) ; Chicagoland Agencies v. Palmer, 364
Ill. 13, 2 N. E. (2d) 910 (1936).
36 347 Ill. 328, 179 N. E. 823 (1932).
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acter" was said to involve no uncertainty. Other expressions
such as "deceptively similar,"3 7 "gross incompetency or reck-
lessness,"'3 8 'reputable dental college," 3 9 or "unprofessional or
dishonorable conduct," 40 have been attacked as rendering statutes
incomplete and thereby forcing upon administrative officials the
necessity of providing definitions, but all have been deemed suffi-
ciently descriptive to form acceptable standards. In one case, in
fact, the court observed'that "the requirements of a statute can
be stated only in general terms." 4' For that reason, a grant of
authority to the Department of Public Works to post signs and
adopt different traffic rules "where a dangerous condition is
found from time to time in divers places to exist" was regarded
as sufficiently specific. 42
Where the words "to his or its satisfaction" have been used,
as in a statute vesting discretion in an officer or commission to
determine the existence of an essential fact, there is some oc-
casion to pause and consider whether such grant of authority is
not wholly lacking in standards and limitations. Such was the
question in Proffitt v. County of Christian3 where an examiner
was obliged to determine whether an applicant for a pension was
blind or not. Since some one in authority had to decide if the
applicant was blind, it was considered to be merely an admin-
istrative discretion legally bestowed on the examiner. It is not
necessary, in such situations, that the applicant "satisfy" the
prejudiced, capricious, unreasonable or arbitrary-minded person
but should obtain approval in the judgment of a reasonable man
acting honestly and without bias or prejudice. Where the proof
is susceptible of but one fair construction, therefore, the official
37 Investors Syndicate v. Hughes, 378 Il. 413, 38 N. E. (2d) 754 (1942).
38 Klafter v. Examiners of Architects, 259 i1. 15, 102 N. E. 193 (1913).
39 Dental Examiners v. People, 123 I1. 227, 13 N. E. 201 (1887).
40 Ramsay v. Shelton, 329 Ill. 432, 160 N. E. 769 (1928) ; People v. Apfelbaum, 251
Ill. 18, 95 N. E. 995 (1911).
41 Investors Syndicate v. Hughes, 378 Ill. 413 at 420, 38 N. E. (2d) 754 at 758
(1942).
42 Hamann v. Lawrence, 354 Ill. 197, 188 N. E. 333 (1933).
43 370 Ill. 530, 19 N. E. (2d) 345 (1939).
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may not refuse to be satisfied so no further definition or standard
is necessary.44
The exercise of reasonable care in drafting the administrative
statute, particularly with reference to the choice of words setting
forth precise standards to guide the administrative official, will
usually result in a constitutional product for the Illinois courts
have been fairly liberal in their application of the separation of
powers doctrine.
II. THE REQUIREMENT OF DUE PROCESS
Administrative functions must also measure up to constitu-
tional requirements in another respect, for the guarantee of due
process of law afforded to the citizen affected by the particular
agency must also be satisfied. When the administrative agency is
performing more than merely ministerial duties, it must act im-
partially or its work clashes with Section 2 of Article 2 of the
state constitution. 45 The major difficulty, though, is to determine
just what is meant by "due process" for it is doubtful if any
definition of the phrase is sufficiently broad to permit the courts
to apply it in every instance. Courts have said that the phrase
is synonymous with "law of the land," so if an administrative
proceeding accords with those rules and forms which have been
established for the protection of personal and property rights
under judicial process, it will probably accord the essentials of
due .process. In an ordinary legal proceeding, two requisities are
insisted upon, to-wit: (1) the giving of adequate notice, and (2)
providing an opportunity for a hearing. If these fundamentals
are observed, whether through ancient and uniform custom or by
the exercise of legislative power in furtherance of the public
good, principles of liberty and justice will have been subserved.46
The term "due process" is not confined to judicial proceedings,
44 Toplis & Harding, Inc. v. Murphy, 384 Ill. 463, 51 N. E. (2d) 505 (1943).
45 Ii. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 2, sets forth the standard due process clause.
46 It follows that failure to observe these requirements will result in a denial of
due process: People v. Belcastro, 356 Ill. 144, 190 N. E. 301 (1934); Sheldon v.
Hoyne, 261 Ill. 222, 103 N. E. 1021 (1914); Comrs. of Drainage Dist. v. Smith,
233 Ill. 417, 84 N. E. 376 (1908).
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for the constitutional guarantee is designed to protect against
arbitrary legislative as well as capricious executive action.47 If,
however, the latter produce a "general public law, legally en-
acted, binding upon all members of the community under all cir-
cumstances," ' 4 enforced by orderly proceedings according to
established rules or forms of procedure, then there will have been
no violation of fundamental rights.
The first element to be examined indicates that the adminis-
trative statute must be a general one "binding upon all members
of the community alike." Illustrative of this requirement are
statutes of the character of the Unemployment Compensation
Act,49 the Retailers' Occupation Tax Act,50 and the Attorneys'
Lien Act,51 all of which have been held valid. But a law which
deprives one class of persons of either personal liberty or the
right to acquire and enjoy property, with all its incidents, such
as is granted to other classes under like conditions and circum-
stances, will be clearly invalid. Evidence of this fact can be found
in Metropolitan Trust Company v. Jones52 which declared Sec-
tion 12 of the Small Loans Act 53 invalid because it restricted the
hypothecation of borrowers' notes to banks thereby singling them
out as a class of favored persons without any reasonable basis
for discriminating against trust companies. Of similiar charac-
ter was the 1933 amendment to the Vagabond Act5 4 which pur-
ported to class as Vagrants all persons who were reputed to be
habitual violators of the criminal law or who were carriers of
47 People v. Belcastro, 356 Ill. 144, 190 N. E. 301 (1934) ; Sheldon v. Hoyne, 261
Ill. 222, 103 N. E. 1021 (1914); People v. Apfelbaum, 251 Ill. 18, 95 N. E. 995
(1911) ; People v. Strassheim, 242 Ill. 359, 90 N. E. 118 (1909).
48 Metropolitan Trust Co. v. Jones, 384 Il1. 248 at 253, 51 N. E. (2d) 256 at 259
(1943). See also People v. Apfelbaum, 251 Ill. 18, 95 N. E. 995 (1911).
49 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 48, § 217 et seq., held valid in Zelney v. Murphy, 387
Ill. 492, 56 N. E. (2d) 754 (1944) ; Murphy v. Cuesta, Rey & Co., 381 Ill. 162, 45
N. . (2d) 26 (1942).
50 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 120, § 440 et seq., upheld in Reif v. Barrett, 355 111.
104, 188 N. E. 889 (1933).
51 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 13, § 14, declared constitutional in Catherwood v.
Morris, 360 Il. 473, 196 N. E. 519 (1935).
52384 Ill. 248, 51 N. E. (2d) 256 (1943).
53 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 74, § 30.
54 Ibid., Ch. 38, § 578.
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concealed weapons. That amendment was declared invalid, as
depriving citizens of their liberty without due process of law, for
it purported to clothe administrative officers with discriminatory
power to arrest on sight.55  For much the same r eason another
statute, placing unlimited discretion in the hands of the fire
marshal to say who should be amenable to the Gas Safety Appli-
ance Act,58 was held invalid in Sheldon v. Hoyne57 as it appeared
that the statute vested in him such an uncontrolled discretion that
it could not be said to be binding upon any particular member of
the community. Where a reasonable basis for classification exists,
however, it is not a violation of due process to enact a statute
having limited application.58
The second element requires that the administrative statute
be enforced "by orderly proceedings." It is not essential that
the "proceedings" be judicial in character, for decisions by ad-
ministrative agencies may well satisfy the requirements of due
process. Thus it is not necessary that a prisoner who has vio-
lated his parole be given a judicial hearing before he can be con-
fined for the term of his original sentence as the parole board
may validly determine whether the terms of the parole have been
broken. 59 It is equally true that a determination by a licensing
agency to the effect that cause exists for the revocation of a
license will involve no violation of constitutional rights.8 0 Per-
haps the best illustration for the application of this concept is to
be found in People ex rel. Radium Dial Company v. Ryan,61 where
many of the earlier cases are reviewed and analyzed.
It should be remembered that the constitutional guarantee of
due process is not one against erroneous decisions. If errors
are committed in the course of "orderly proceedings," even
though unjust decisions are thereby reached, the attack thereon
55 People v. Beleastro, 356 Ill. 144, 190 N. E. 301 (1934).
B6 Laws 1911, p. 146.
57 261 Il. 222, 103 N. E. 1021 (1914).
5s People v. Stokes, 281 Il1. 159, 118 N. E. 87 (1917).
59 People v. Strassheim, 242 Ill. 359, 90 N. E. 118 (1909).
60 Klafter v. Examiners of Architects, 259 I1. 15, 102 N. E. 193 (1913).
61371 Ill. 597, 21 N. E. (2d) 749 (1939).
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must be in the manner provided by law rather than on constitu-
tional grounds, as a mere error in decision does not deprive the
losing party of the benefit of due process . 2 The scope and man-
ner of obtaining review of such erroneous decisions is discussed
in a subsequent section.
One other factor needs mention at this point. The adminis-
trative proceeding must be conducted "according to established
rules or forms of procedure." It is fundamental that no judicial
proceeding would be valid if the judge were biased or prejudiced
against a party. Federal administrative statutes recognize that
due process would be violated if personal rights had to be sub-
mitted to prejudiced officials, for they provide for disqualification
of such officials on proper motion.6 3 No statute in this state makes
provision for the disqualification of administrative personnel
under such circumstances, but the Supreme Court has declared
that statutes which forced persons to submit their controversies
to tribunals composed of biased or interested officials would
clearly violate constitutional rights.6 4 Some statutory provision,
similar to the one for securing change of venue in judicial pro-
ceedings, could well be enacted in this state.
III. EXTENT OF THE RULE-MAKING POWER
When expediency dictates that authority be conferred on
administrative agencies to survey, direct and control particular
activities, the legislature may vest such agencies with the power
to formulate rules and regulations to help carry out the desired
objective. That power is not to be regarded as general in scope
for it is limited to the making of rules necessary to the per-
formance of the duties imposed. Such rules must, consequently,
62 Abrams v. Awotin, 388 I1. 42, 57 N. E. (2d) 464 (1944) ; Durkin v. Hey, 376
Ill. 292, 33 N. E. (2d) 463 (1941).
63 See, for example, the qualifications laid down for members of the Federal
Power Commission, 16 U. S. C. A. § 792. See also 42 Am. Jur., Public Administra-
tive Law, §§ 20 and 23.
64 City of Naperville v. Wehrle. 340 Ill. 579, 173 N. E. 165 (1930); Ramsay v.
Shelton, 329 Il. 432, 160 N. E. 769 (1928); Comrs. of Drainage Dist. v. Smith,
233 Ill. 417, 84 N. E. 376 (1908).
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relate to procedural matters. Although the agency may construe
the statute and such construction will be given weight, the courts
will not allow the administrative body ,to extend the operation of
the statute by rules or regulations,65 for to permit this would again
involve an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.
A number of cases have arisen in Illinois testing the validity
of administrative rules and regulations. In People ex rel. Chicago
Bar Association v. Goodman,66 for example, a rule of the Indus-
trial Commission which authorized laymen to appear and present
claims on behalf of applicants for compensation was held invalid
on the ground that neither the commission nor the legislature had
the right to grant to non-lawyers the authority to practice law.
6 7
Rules which purport to affect or create substantive rights are
likewise open to condemnation. That point is amply illustrated
by Zurich Accident Insurance Company v. Industrial Commis-
sion,65 a case striking down another rule of the Industrial Coin-,
mission which purported to declare that no insurance policy
should be terminated, whether by cancellation or lapse of time,
without ten days' notice being first given to the commission. The
rule also purported to declare that liability of the insurer con-
tinued until the expiration of the ten-day period. The court
pointed out that the rule dealt with substantive matters rather
than procedural ones, tended to create liability where the law
would find none, and was, as a consequence, void. In the same
way, the administrative agency will not be allowed, by rule, to
nullify a statutory provision by substituting its own method for
obtaining security of compensation if that method is different
from, hence derogatory to, the statutory one.6 9 Certainly, if the
rule or regulation is arbitrary, unreasonable, or based upon a
65 Mallen Co. v. Department of Finance, 372 Ill. 598, 25 N. E. (2d) 43 (1940).
66366 Ill. 346, 8 N. E. (2d) 941 (1937).
67 A rule of the Department of Finance was declared invalid for the same rea-
son in Chicago Bar Ass'n v. United Taxpayers of America, 312 Ill. App. 243, 38 N.
E. (2d) 349 (1942).
6s 325 Ill. 452, 156 N. E. 307 (1927).
69 People v. O'Connell, 386 Il. 606, 54 N. E. (2d) 521 (1944).
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mistaken concept of the law, the courts will not hesitate to declare
the same null and void.7 0
On the other hand, rules promulgated by administrative
agencies have been held valid if they are reasonable in scope and
purpose and do tend to carry out statutory objectives. A rule
of a board of education prohibiting teachers from belonging to,
or being affiliated with, trade unions was upheld in People ex rel.
Fursman v. City of Chigago7I against the claim that such rule
impaired the contract of employment. The court pointed out
that the selection of a teacher was a mere offer of employment
subject to all proper board rules and acceptance of that offer did
not occur until the teacher appeared for duty on the first day of
school. It was also noted that there was no restriction in either
constitution or statute against such a rule. Other rules adopted
pursuant to an authority to discipline and control schools under
the jurisdiction of the board were upheld in Wilson v. Board of
Education of Chicago72 as being reasonable and not involving
any abuse of discretion.
IV. THE ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTION
A. QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS
Once the general structure of the administrative agency has
been found to meet constitutional requirements, any further criti-
cism must be directed against the manner in which it performs
its functions. Comment has already been made on the fact that
many such agencies must exercise discretion in the performance
of their duties. If the judgment exercised is merely incidental
to the execution of a ministerial power, no exercise of judicial
power is involved. But the line is often difficult to draw. One
great constitutional writer has noted that the judicial power is
.one which adjudicates upon and protects the rights and interests
70 Schireson v. Walsh, 354 Ill. 40, 187 N. E. 921 (1933) ; People ex rel. Killeen v.
Geary, 317 Ill. App. 463, 47 N. E. (2d) 102 (1943) ; Murphy v. Houston. 250 Ill.
App. 385 (1928).
71 278 Ill. 318, 116 N. E. 158 (1917).
72 233 Ill. 464, 84 N. E. 697 (1908).
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of individual citizens and to that end construes and applies the
law.73  That definition received early acceptance in this state
74
and has been approved on a number of occasions. 75 Since the
judicial power is vested in the courts,76 it was observed in State
ex rel. City of Rockford v. Maynard" that no person except a
judge or a justice of the peace might exercise the judicial power.
Although the legislature might multiply the number of certain of
these officials, 78 the power reposed in them after the legislature
has exercised its prerogative stems directly from the constitution.
As a consequence, it is legally impossible to vest the judicial
power in administrative agencies, and efforts of such agencies
to pronounce decisions having authoritative effect, as by divest-
ing titles, have come to nought.7 9
A brief analysis of some of the cases will illustrate how the
Supreme Court has insisted on the strict observance of the divi-
sion of power and how it has prevent ministerial officials from
performing judicial functions. In Hall v. Marks,s° for example,
a judgment by default was entered by the clerk of court but was
reversed and the statute held unconstitutional on the ground that
the power to adjudge, determine and pronounce judgment was
intrinsically a judicial one and it was a perversion of language
to call the clerk of a court a judicial officer even though he was
attached to the judicial department. The ordinance in Poppen v*
Holmes,s ' enacted pursuant to statute, purported to authorize
the pound master to sell impounded animals for penalties in-
curred but it was held that the function of determining whether
73 Cooley, Const. Lir., 8th Ed., Vol. I, p. 184.
74 Owners of Lands v. People, 113 Ill. 296 (1885).
75 People v. Chase, 165 Ill. 527 at 538, 46 N. E. 454 at 458 (1897) ; People v.
Simon, 176 Il. 165, 52 N. E. 910 (1898) ; Devine v. Brunswick-Balke Co., 270 I11.
504, 110 Ill. 780 (1915).
76 Il1. Const. 1870, Art. VI, § 1.
77 14 Ill. 419 (1853).
78 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. VI, § 1, permits the legislature to vest the judicial power
in other courts "as may be created by law," with the exception that there shall be
but one Supreme Court.
79 See, for example, C., S. F. & C. Ry. Co. v. Lorance, 180 Ini. 180, 54 N. E. 284
(1899).
so34 Ill. 358 (1864).
s144 Ill. 360 (1867).
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a penalty had in fact been incurred was purely judicial in char-
acter, hence could not be exercised by that official. Of somewhat
similar character was Bullock v. Geomble,8 2 only there the assess-
ment of damage caused by stock running at large was to be made
by three disinterested citizens of the town. The latest pronounce-
ment on this point is found in Reid v. Smith8 3 wherein the statute
authorized the department to withhold a forfeiture or penalty
from the contract price and purported to vest it with power to
render decisions in that regard. The fact that an appeal from
the decision of the department was permitted was insufficient to
save the statute.
As the legislature itself may not perform the functions of
the judicial department, it clearly cannot validly delegate the
judicial power to any of its creatures. Decisions by the latter
must, therefore, be confined to the exercise of discretion in minis-
terial matters, must be no higher than quasi-judicial in scope, and
must not purport to adjudicate upon the rights and interests of
individuals.
B. RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL
Many administrative agencies are authorized, in the per-
formance of their functions, to hear and determine matters of
fact which determinations may or may not be open to judicial
review. It has been argued that investigations of that character
violated the constitutional guaranty of right to trial by jury,84
since it took from the jury the principal function for its existence.
The right, of an administrative agency to exercise the duty
of ascertaining the facts was vindicated in Grand Trunk Western
Railway Company v. Industrial Commission 85 on the ground that
the legislature might, in the exercise of the police power, confine
the scope of the guaranty of the right to trial by jury. That case
8245 Ii1. 218 (1867).
83375 Ill. 147, 30 N. E. (2d) 908 (1940).
84 Ill. Const. 1870. Art. II, § 5.
85 291 Il1. 167, 125 N. E. 748 (1920).
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involved the issue as to whether or not a workmen's compensation
proceeding deprived an' employer of a jury trial. The court
noted that while the constitutional provision directed that trial
by jury "as heretofore enjoyed" was to remain inviolate, still
the guaranty extended only to those causes recognized by law.
The purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act was to take
away the cause of action theretofore enjoyed by the employee on
the one hand and to abolish certain defenses formerly available
to the employer on the other. In place thereof, a fixed and cer-
tain statutory indemnity emerged in place of both. As the power
to extinguish a pre-existing form of action known to the common
law was acknowledged to exist, it followed that upon its extin-
guishment the incidental right to trial by jury thereon disap-
peared. 86
Since no person has a vested interest in any particulhr rule
of procedural law, he may not insist that it remain unchanged for
his benefit.8 7 If the legislature, by a proper exercise of the police
power, sets aside one body of rules and establishes another sys-
tem in its place, no person can complain that rights he had pre-
viously enjoyed are no longer available. Should the legislature
validly create an entirely new body of rights and provide a new
tribunal for their enforcement, it goes without saying that no
person can insist upon older methods of fact-determination if the
legislature sees fit to provide newer ones for use in such a tri-
bunal. It follows, therefore, that no constitutional right to trial
by jury is violated by permitting the administrative agency to
hear and determine disputed issues ot fact.
A related problem involved in ascertaining the facts on any
administrative question concerns the ability of the agency to com-
pel the attendance of witnesses and the production of books,
records, or other documents containing essential data. Some
86 The court said:- "The right of jury trial being incidental to the right of
action, to destroy the latter is to leave the former nothing upon- which to
operate." 291 Ill. 167 at 176, 125 N. E. 748 at 752.
87 Wall v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 290 Ill. 227, 125 N. E. 20 (1919), appeal
dismissed 256 U. S. 125, 41 S. Ct. 402, 65 L. Ed. 856 (1921).
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agencies possess statutory authority to issue subpoenas, but
enforcement thereof is left somewhat vague and indefinite. As
the agency would not enjoy the power to punish for contemptuous
disregard of its subpoenas, it is usually directed to "apply to"
or "invoke the aid of" the courts. Little. has been said on this
matter by the courts of Illinois, but it would seem from the
decision in Durkin v. Hey 8 that judicial aid can be obtained only
upon the giving of notice and the granting of a hearing even
though the administrative statute is silent on the subject.
V. JUDICIAL REVIEW
Because most administrative determinations are only quasi-
judicial in nature, some form of judicial action may be necessary
to give enforcible effect to them. When recourse to the courts
becomes necessary, the judicial department is then able to review
the action, whether taken or contemplated, find can thereby
preserve the balance of power intrinsic in our form of state gov-
ernment. Constitutional issues as well as questions concerning
the proper exercise of administrative powers may then be
examined.
A. REFUSAL TO REVIEW
There are times, however, when the courts will refuse to
review administrative acts, particularly where the power exer-
cised by the agency is purely a ministerial one. So long as no
law is construed or applied, so long as no legal rights are adjudi-
cated, the courts will not intervene for it is not their province to
substitute themselves in place of the adm inistrative agency. Such
was the holding in People ex rel. Palmer v. Niehaus89 where the
Supreme Court refused to substitute itself for the Department
of Insurance or to assume the clearly defined obligations placed
on that body by the legislature. It has also refused to interfere
with the exercise of sound business judgment on the part of tax-
8s 376 Ill. 292, 33 N. E. (2d) 463 (1941).
s9 356 Ill. 104, 190 N. E. 349 (1934). See also People v. Palmer, 363 Ill. 499, 2
N. E. (2d) 728 (1936); State v. Ill. Central R. R. Co., 246 Ill. 188, 92 N. E. 814
(1910).
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ing agencies, being content to act only to prevent a clear abuse
of discretionary power by such officials. 0°
Even where administrative decisions have been based on
statutes of doubtful nature, the courts have refused to weigh the
propriety or expediency of the legislative acts or to seek for the
motives which prompted their passage let alone test the public
policy reflected thereby. They have investigated to see if such
statutes were within legislative competence, whether classifica-
tions therein were reasonable, and whether equal protection has
been accorded, but beyond that they will not go.9' They cannot
supply omissions, for to do so would involve them in the sphere
of legislative action. 2  Decisions of administrative agencies will
not be reversed if there is legal evidence to support the same, for
it is deemed not to be the province of the courts to pass upon the
weight or sufficiency thereof,93 and if the agency is clearly acting
as a subordinate of the legislature, judicial intervention would be
deemed objectionable as an encroachment on a co-ordinate branch
of the government. 4
One thing is certain, no court will assume to weigh an exer-
cise of discretion by a public official acting within the scope of his
duty for the judicial department has carefully refrained from
encroaching upon the power of such an officer. If any reasonable
doubt exists as to the question of discretion or want of it, courts
are even inclined to extend the benefit of the doubt in favor of the
official.95
go People v. Westminster Build. Corp., 361 Il1. 153, 197 N. E. 573 (1935) ; People
v. B. & 0. S. W. Ry. Co., 353 Ill. 492, 187 N. E. 463 (1933).
9' Reif v. Barrett, 355 Ill. 104, 188 N. E. 889 (1934).
92 Boshuizen v. Thompson & Taylor Co., 360 Ill. 160, 195 N. E. 625 (1935).
93Goelitz Co. v. Industrial Board, 278 Ill. 164, 115 N. E. 855 (1917); Parker-
Wash. Co. v. Industrial Board, 274 Ill. 498, 113 N. E. 976 (1916) ; Victor Chem-
ical Works v. Industrial Board, 274 Ill. 11, 113 N. E. 173 (1916).
94People v. Eakin, 383 II. 383, 50 N. E. (2d) 474 (1943). But see Catholic
Bishop v. Palos Park, 286 I1. 400, 121 N. E. 561 (1919) ; City of Chicago v. M. &
M. Hotel Co., 248 Ill. 264, 93 N. E. 753 (1911).
95 Investors Syndicate v. Hughes, 378 Ill. 413, 38 N. E. (2d) 754 (1942); Mac-
Gregor v. Miller, 324 Ill. 113, 154 N. E. 707 (1926) ; Smith v. McDowell, 148 Ill.
51, 35 N. E. 141 (1893).
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B. GROUNDS FOR REVIEW
In those situations where judicial action is necessary or
proper, because private legal rights and obligations are under
consideration, the matter of judicial review has experienced a
long history of development. The principal functions of the
courts in their relation to administrative agencies on this point
have been to interpret the authority under which administrative
action has been taken and to test such points as jurisdiction, due
process, standards and definitions, and the validity and applica-
bility of agency rules. An analysis of some of the cases will
illustrate the extent to which the courts will review administra-
tive action.
There is no question but what the courts will grant review
and declare administrative statutes unconstitutional if there has
been a failure to accord due process, for any statute which applies
to one person or property and not to another while both are in
the same situation or of the same class is clearly invalid.96 It
should be remembered, in. this respect, that administrative as
well as judicial proceedings are governed by this fundamental
requirement.97
. Right to seek review and to obtain relief will also be accorded
where the law fails to make provision for the control of adminis-
trative action. Thus a zoning statute which gives no direction
or furnishes no rule for determining what are "practical diffi-
culties or unnecessary hardships" was held invalid in Welton v.
Hamilton.98  Again, an ordinance which authorizes a building
inspector to exercise summary powers to abate a business which
he may, in his unguided judgment, determine to be a nuisance can
be judicially tested.9 9 If a permissible discretion is lodged in an
96 Sheldon v. Hoyne, 261 Ill. 222, 103 N. E. 1021 (1914).
97 Italia America Shipping Corp. v. Nelson, 323 Ill. 427, 154 N. E. 198 (1926).
See also cases cited ante, note 47.
98344 Ill. 82, 176 N. E. 333 (1931).
99 City of Kankakee v. N. Y. C. R. R. Co., 387 Il. 109, 55 N. E. (2d) 87 (1944).
See also Moy v. City of Chicago, 309 Ill. 242, 140 N. E. 845 (1923) ; Noel v. People,
187 Il. 587, 58 N. E. 616 (1900).
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administrative agency, there is an implied term in all such stat-
utes that the discretion is to be exercised fairly and impartially.
As a consequence, the courts will examine the action taken by the
official to see whether such discretion has been abused or exer-
cised with manifest injustice.'
Judicial review may also be obtained whenever the rules and
regulations adopted by governmental agencies affect substantive
rights instead of dealing simply with matters of procedure, 2 or
operate to expand the statute under which they are promulgated.3
Of interest on the latter point is the recent decision in North-
western Institute of Chiropbdy v. Thompson4 wherein the court
reviewed a determination by an agency to the effect that a certain
school did not measure up to administrative rules as to what
should be necessary for any school to be "reputable and in good
standing." The court observed that the rules adopted by the
department were ineffective because the act made no provision
for investigation or hearing by the department before the promul-
gation thereof.
The question of jurisdiction is always open to judicial inves-
tigation for it is at this point that the agency is most likely to be
found exercising judicial power in contravention of the state
constitution. Some cases on this aspect of review have already
been noted.5 In addition thereto, mention might be made of
Jarman v. Board of Review6 in which the administrative agency
purported to make an assessment of omitted property without
hearing any evidence to support such assessment. It was held
that the determination of the agency might be reviewed on cer-
1 People v. Brady, 268 Ill. 192. 108 N. E. 1009 (1915): People v. Potts, 264 Ill.
522,106 N. E. 524 (1914) ; Town of Somonauk v. People, 178 Ill. 631, 53 N. E.
314 (1899) ; Dental Examiners v. People, 123 Ill. 227, 13 N. E. 201 (1887) ; C., B. &
Q. R. R. Co. v. Wilson, 17 fl1. 122 (1855) ; People ex rel. Barrett v. Fond du Lac
State Bank, 310 Ill. App. 28, 33 N. E. (2d) 714 (1941).
2 Zurich Accident Ins. Co. v. Indus. Com., 325 Ill. 452, 156 N. E. 307 (1927).
3 Madsen v. Industrial Com., 383 II. 590, 50 N. E. (2d) 707 (1943); Cemetery
Association v. Murphy, 383 Ill. 301, 50 N. E. (2d) 582 (1943) ; Mallen Co. v. De-
partment of Finance, 372 Ill. 598, 25 N. E. (2d) 43 (1940).
4 386 il. 615, 55 N. E. (2d) 61 (1944).
5 See cases cited ante, notes 3 to 17 inclusive.
6 345 Il. 248, 178 N. E. 91 (1931).
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tiorari since it amounted to an exercise of judicial power over
the property of the taxpayer. Certainly, if the agency has acted
entirely beyond the scope of the statute creating it or has dealt
with matters not within the purview thereof, judicial review well
may be obtained.7
Review may also become proper when the question is not
solely one of law but is one of fact also. Pivotal consideration
in these situations may turn on either the statutory authority or
the sufficiency of evidence upon which the action was taken. So
closely related are these questions in many cases, particularly
where statutory language is broad, that it is not always possible
to distinguish whether decisions are based on one or the other
ground. If constitutionality of the statute depends on a question
of fact, courts will usually be cautious about reaching a conclu-
sion on the facts contrary to that obtained by the legislature, par-
ticularly where the question is a fairly debatable one, so that the
only recourse against possible abuse is by appeal to the legis-
lature." Such reluctance, however, is no longer displayed if the
fact determination is made by an agency rather than the legis-
lature, especially so where the agency may have acted beyond the
scope of its authority, made findings without any reasonable
basis in evidence, or has infringed upon constitutional rights. 9
Review solely on the question of the sufficiency of evidence
to support administrative action is fairly rare for the courts
usually are not prone to upset purely factual findings.10 As the
court observed in Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Illinois
Commerce Commission," if the agency has not contravened any
7 Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 288 I1. 603, 124 N. E. 344 (1919).
s People v. Eakin, 383 Ill. 383, 50 N. E. (2d) 474 (1943) ; American Asphalt Co.
v. Chicago, 330 Ill. 330, 161 N. E. 772 (1928).
9 Commerce Com. v. C. & E. I. Ry. Co., 332 Ill. 243, 163 N. E. 664 (1928), par-
ticularly 332 Ill. pp. 248-9; Choate v. Commerce Com.. 309 I1. 248, 141 N. E. 12
(1923) ; Utilities Com. v. C., M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 287 Ill. 412, 122 N. E. 803 (1919).
10 Banner Tailoring Co. v. Industrial Com., 354 .Il. 513, 188 N. E. 548 (1933);
Vulcan Detinning Co. v. Indus. Com.. 295 Ill. 141, 128 N. E. 917 (1920); Sparks
Milling Co. v. Industrial Com., 293 Ill. 350, 127 N. E. 737 (1920). But see also
Lickhalter v. Industrial Com., 383 I1. 527, 50 N. E. (2d) 729 (1943).
it 387 Ill. 256, 56 N. H. (2d) 432 (1944).
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constitutional limitation or rule of law, has acted within constitu-
tional and statutory authority, and has a substantial basis in
evidence for its findings, the same "cannot be set aside. "12 On
the other hand, if the order is unreasonable because lacking a
basis in evidence or because the agency exceeded its authority,
judicial review can always be obtained. Even if the facts are not
in dispute, the courts will grant review to determine, as a matter
of law, whether the uncontroverted facts are sufficient to support
the finding, 13 and statutes which purport to limit judicial review
solely to questions of law will be disregarded in this respect.
Some statutes specify that rules of evidence are not to apply or
be binding upon the administrative tribunal, at least so far as the
admission of immaterial or incompetent evidence is concerned.
It does not follow, though, that findings may be based upon such
incompetent material, so judicial review still may be had to deter-
mine whether there is competent and sufficient evidence to sup-
port the administrative action."4
It is evident, therefore, that fairly extensive grounds exist
to support judicial review in all cases of administrative discretion
having bearing on private legal rights or obligations.
C. METHODS OF REVIEW
The long established rule of this state has been that the
appellate jurisdiction existing in our courts has been provided for
the purpose of reviewing the decisions of inferior courts rather
than those of non-judicial bodies. As hearings before, and deter-
minations of, administrative officials are not judicial proceedings,
it follows that any statutory provision authorizing judicial re-
view, whether called an appeal or not, must refer to an action of
some sort in a nisi prius court with further review, if permitted,
before the appropriate Appellate or Supreme Court. The varied
12 387 Ill. 256 at 275, 56 N. E. (2d) 432 at 440.
13 Lickhalter v. Industrial Com., 383 11. 527, 50 N. E. (2d) 729 (1943).
14 See, for example, Durkin v. Luecht & Co., Inc., 379 I1. 227, 40 N. E. (2d)
69 (1942) ; Northwestern Yeast Co. v. Indus. Com., 378 Ill. 195, 37 N. E. (2d) 806
(1941).
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methods of securing review, including any pertinent points of
procedure, are here presented.
It should be noted at the outset that in all civil proceedings,
both at law and in equity, there is a right to review. The expres-
sion "civil proceeding" comprehends every claim or demand
cognizable in a court of justice at the time of the adoption of our
constitution. It also includes any forms of action created since
then in which personal or property rights are dealt with in the
fashion customarily followed at law or in chancery. If the right
asserted is statutory in origin but similar in character to com-
mon-law ones, there is no requirement in law that the provisions
for its enforcement, at least in the initial stages, must accord with
common-law methods, but when such right is eventually asserted
in a court of record, so that the procedure for its enforcement
assumes the aspects of an ordinary civil proceeding, then an
appeal is available as in other civil suits. 15
In contrast, the term "civil proceeding" does not extend to
special statutory proceedings involving rights or providing reme-
dies of a kind not previously known but utterly dissimilar from
those enforced in legal or equitable actions. Rights and remedies
of this character are not reviewable by ordinary civil appeals and
any re-examination of such proceedings can be had only if the
legislature has so provided or if some common-law writ can be
made available. 16
Statutory provisions authorizing judicial review of deter-
minations by administrative agencies, though designating such
15 In Lavin v. Wells Bros. Co., 272 Ill. 609, 112 N. E. 271 (1916), for example, it
was held that appeal would lie from a determination of the circuit court in a work-
men's compensation proceeding because the court concluded that such a claim
was "of the same nature as any suit or proceeding at law for the purpose of
fixing a liability and recovering money, and the result is either an order for the
payment of money or the defeat of the claimant." The modern procedure in mat-
ters of that nature Is discussed in Angerstein, Appellate Procedure in Workmen's
Compensation Cases, 23 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEw 205 and 287, particularly pp.
289-90.
1 An excellent discussion of the right to secure review in proceedings of this
character is presented in Superior Coal Co. v. O'Brien, 383 Ill. 394, 50 N. E. (2d)
453 (1943).
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revew as an "appeal," really provide for an original judicial
investigation of the matter. As a consequence, such review must
first be had in a court having original jurisdiction.1 7  These stat-
utes do not confer any appellate jurisdiction on such courts but,
in effect, provide for a hearing de novo therein, for any attempt
to make such review into a true appeal would be asking the
courts to assume a jurisdiction they do not possess and will not
exercise. 8
(1) Common Law Certiorari
The common law writ of certiorari, issued by the circuit
courts, 9 has long been available in this state, even in the absence
of statutory authority, as a means of searching the records of
inferior tribunals exercising functions of a judicial nature.2 0
That writ may -issue whenever the inferior tribunal has (1)
exceeded its jurisdiction or (2) has proceeded illegally, provided
no appeal, writ of error, or other mode of direct review is avail-
able. To support the decision of the inferior tribunal, the record
returned in response to the writ must show that the agency has
acted upon evidence before it and the testimony, which must
accompany the record, should fairly tend to sustain the order.2 '
Conclusions of law, unsupported by testimony, will clearly be
insufficient to sustain the determination. 22
17 People's Gas Co. v. City of Chicago, 309 Ill. 40, 139 N. E. 867 (1923).
18 Investors Syndicate v. Hughes, 378 Ill. 413, 38 N. E. (2d) 754 (1942) ; People
v. Fisher, 373 Ill. 228, 25 N. E. (2d) 785 (1940) ; Borreson v. Dept. of Public Wel-
fare, 368 Ill. 425, 14 N. E. (2d) 485 (1938); North Chicago Cong. v. Bd. of Ap-
peals, 358 II. 549, 193 N. E. 519 (1934) ; Rail. and Ware. Com. v. L. & M. Ry. Co.,
267 Ill. 337, 108 N. E. 347 (1915) ; City of Aurora v. Schoeberlein, 230 Ill. 496, 82
N. E. 860 (1907); Maxwell v. People, 189 Ill. 546, 59 N. E. 1101 (1901).
19 That writ may issue from the Superior Court of Cook County by reason of Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 37, § 72.25. See also Dietzgen Co. v. Industrial Commission, 299
Ill. 159, 132 N. E. 541 (1921).
20 Bell v. Mattoon Water-Works Co., 235 Ill. 218, 85 N. E. 214 (1908) ; Dewell v.
Sny Island Drainage Dist., 232 I1. 215, 83 N. E. 811 (1908) ; Wright v. Highway
Commissioners, 150 Ill. 138, 36 N. E. 980 (1894) ; Lees v. Drainage Commissioners,
125 Ill. 47, 16 N. E. 915 (1888) 1 Ennis v. Ennis, 110 Ill. 78 (1884) ; Hyslop v. Finch,
D9 Ill. 171 (1881) ; Miller v. Trustees of Schools, 88 Ill. 26 (1878) ; Doolittle v.
Galena & Chicago Union R. R. Co., 14 Ill. 380 (1853).
21 Funkhouser v. Coffin, 301 Ill. 257, 133 N. E. 649 (1922).
22 In Carroll v. Houston, 341 Ill. 531 at 536, 173 N. E. 657 at 659 (1930), the court
3tated: "The record must show facts giving the inferior tribunal jurisdiction and
mere conclusions of law are not sufficient."
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If the statute makes no specific provision for review, so that
statutory certiorari is not available, then review must be had
through the use of the common-law writ,23 with all of its limita-
tions. Jurisdiction thereunder is limited to a determination,
from inspection of the record, solely to the question of whether
the agency acted within its powers and jurisdiction. The nisi
prius court may not hear additional evidence, 24 and the only
orders possible are either to quash the writ or to quash the
record. 25' Further judicial review must pursue ordinary channels
unless some constitutional question requires direct appeal to the
Supreme Court.26
(2) Statutory Certiorari
Many administrative statutes make explicit provision for
review by "certiorari," but this term is not synonymous with the
common-law expression for the certiorari there referred to is
some statutory form of proceeding comparable to but distinct
from the ancient remedy. The procedure to be followed, the
scope given to the writ, the time within which it may be sought,
and similar matters, must be determined from an examination of
the particular statute. Writs of this character fall into two
classes: those where the reviewing court is given power to inves-
tigate questions of law or fact, or both, with authority to enter-
tain and pronounce certain specified orders, and those where the
statute is silent as to the type of orders to be rendered. In the
latter situation, the court may only quash the writ or the record.2 7
The statutory writ may permit the court to hear additional
evidence in support of the decision of the tribunal, in contrast to
the situation present when the earlier remedy is used. 28  It may
likewise permit the court to use a different standard in evaluating
the record instead of confining it to the common-law rule that the
2- Institute of Chiropody v. Thompson, 386 Ill. 615, 55 N. E. (2d) 61 (1944).
24 Heppe v. Mooberry, 350 Ill. 641, 183 N. E. 636 (1932).
25 Wittbrodt v. Woodland, 295 I. App. 431, 15 N. E. (2d) 318 (1938).
26 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 199.
27 People v. Fisher, 373 I1. 228, 25 N. E. (2d) 785 (1940).
28 See, for example, Deslauries v. Soucie, 222 I1. 522, 78 N. E. 799 (1906).
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order had to be upheld unless it was palpably or manifestly
against the weight of the evidence. Prospect of further review
before a higher court thereunder will depend upon (1) whether
the statute expressly authorizes an appeal, (2) clearly forbids it,
or (3) whether writ of error might lie to the trial court. If the
statutory proceeding involves personal or property rights, the
writ of error, unless expressly forbidden, may be obtained as a
matter of right.29
(3) Other Extra-ordinary Writs
It is sometimes possible to obtain judicial review of adminis-
trative action by other means than certiorari. The writ of
mandamus, commanding the performance of non-discretionary
ministerial duties, may be utilized to compel agencies to proceed
in accordance with mandates or judgments of reviewing courts.
It may also be used to compel action even in cases where the duty
is of a discretionary character although there the writ may not
direct the particular manner in which the administrative official
shall act for the court will not substitute its judgment for that of
the officer. 30 Where discretionary power has been delegated, the
duty is more than a ministerial one and the court should not
anticipate that the official will act in an unreasonable, arbitrary,
or unjust fashion.3 1 The writ, therefore, is most often used after
discretion has been exercised so that an abuse thereof can be
demonstrated to exist.
Illustrations of this character may be found in cases where
mandamus has issued to test whether a public official has cor-
rectly construed a statute when refusing to issue a corporate
charter,3 2 or has given a mistaken construction thereto.3 3 It has
29 Superior Coal Co. v. O'Brien, 383 Ii1. 394, 50 N. E. (2d) 453 (1943). See also
Butler Mfg. Co. v. Dept. of Finance, 383 Ii1. 220, 49 N. E. (2d) 31 (1943) ; Institute
of Chiropody v. Thompson, 386 Ill. 615, 55 N. E. (2d) 61 (1944).
so People v. City of Chicago, 234 Ill. 416, 84 N. E. 1044 (1908).
31 Gustafson v. Withersfield Township High School, 319 Ill. App. 255, 49 N. E.
(2d) 311 (1943).
32 People v. Potts, 264 Ill. 522, 106 N. E. 524 (1914).
33 People v. Czarnecki, 254 Ill. 72, 98 N. E. 252 (1912); Town of Somonauk v.
People, 178 Ill. 631, 53 N. E. 314 (1899) ; C., B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Wilson, 17 Ill. 122
(1855).
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been utilized where the administrative officer has positively
refused to act,34 as well as in cases where the inferior tribunal
has acted without power or authority.85  It will, of course, lie
where there has been a clear abuse of discretion, so remedy by
mandamus may often prove to be a desirable substitute for
certiorari.
The writ of quo warranto, or its statutory counterpart,36 may
be used to question the right of one charged with usurping, in-
truding into or unlawfully holding or exercising any office of
public nature.3 7 It can, therefore, be used to test the authority or
legality of the actions of even an appointed administrative offi-
cer,38 provided the statute or the common law has fixed some
qualification upon the office which the particular incumbent does
not satisfy, or the statute under which he purports to act is void.
As there are limitations upon the right of a private person to
claim the benefits of this high prerogative writ,3 9 however, it may
not be as readily available as other remedies.
Still another remedy is provided in the form of an equitable
injunction, open to use whenever irreparable injury is threatened
to private rights by administrative action. If the question is one
of the exercise of discretion, injunction will not lie for it would
require the chancellor to exercise the discretion placed by law in
the hands of the administrative official. But if the law fails to
regulate that discretion, so as to leave it to the official to deter-
mine whether the law shall be enforced and, if so, against whom,
then the arbitrary quality of the statute may well be tested by
injunction. Such was the holding in Sheldon v. Hoyne,40 where
34 People v. Board of Supervisors, 308 Il. 543, 139 N. E. 898 (1923) ; Dental Ex-
aminers v. People, 123 Il1. 227, 13 N. E. 201 (1887) ; Bransfield Co. v. Kingery, 283
Ill. App. 405 (1936).
85 City of Chicago v. People, 210 Ill. 84, 71 N. E. 816 (1904).
86 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 112, § 9 et seq.
ST See, for example, People ex rel. Reich v. McCoy, 387 II1. 288. 56 N. E. (2d) 393
(1944) ; People ex rel. Cromer v. Village of Maywood, 381 Ill. 337, 45 N. E. (2d)
617 (1942).
88 People ex rel. Lafferty v. Owen, 286 Ill. 638, 122 N. E. 132 (1919).
39 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 112, § 10.
40 261 I1. 222, 103 N. E. 1021 (1914).
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the statute permitted the public official to exercise a discretion as
to whether or not certain buildings should be exempted from the
operation of the act so as to permit the law to depend on the
caprice of the officer. Injunction has also been permitted to deter-
mine whether the administrative officer has been guilty of an
improper sub-delegation of his powers. 4 1  There is ample law,
therefore, to support the use of this remedy.
(4) Right to Further Review
Each of the foregoing remedies will be provided, if at all, in
nisi prius courts. Should further review before intermediate or
higher tribunals be desired or necessary, questions may arise as to
whether or not limitations exist upon the right to obtain further
review. Note has already been made of the fact that some such
limitations do exist. When constitutional or other jurisdictional
questions are involved, appeal direct to the Supreme Court is
permitted under Section 75 of the Civil Practice Act,4 2 notwith-
standing any provision in the particular statute to the contrary.4 3
The right to appeal generally, however, is statutory in nature
and can apply only to the final orders, judgments or decrees of
the trial courts. Being statutory in nature, the legislature may
circumscribe the right and it has, in many instances, limited fur-
ther review solely to writs of error issued as a matter of grace
within a limited time.44  Such a restriction was held valid in
Durkin v. Hey,45 although the court did indicate that if an appeal
is also permitted it is merely a cumulative remedy.
Standard prodedure for further review in administrative
matters before higher judicial tribunals is provided through the
use of the writ of error. Such a writ will lie as a matter of right
from either the Supreme or an Appellate Court, even in the
absence of statutory authority, in all proceedings not according
41 Ramsay v. Shelton, 329 Il. 432, 160 N. E. 769 (1928).
42 Il. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 199.
43 Institute of Chiropody v. Thompson, 386 Il. 615, 55 N. E. (2d) 61 (1944).
44 See, for example, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 48, § 172.19(f) (2).
45 376 Ill. 292, 33 N. E. (2d) 463 (1941). See also Haines v. People, 97 Ill. 161
(1880).
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to the course of the common law affecting property rights or
liberty, since the party affected has no other mode for obtaining
review. 46  The legislature may not derogate against this right for
it is inherent in the common-law jurisdiction of the higher tri-
bunals. If property rights or personal liberty are not involved,
however, review by writ of error will be denied for the Supreme
Court has consistently refused to give that writ any wider scope
than it possessed in common-law days.47 Use of the writ has been
denied, therefore, in proceedings to remove a county seat,48 to
organize a drainage district,49 to review the action of the Secre-
tary of State over the filing of a statemert for the purpose of
classifying corporate shares or regulating the sale of securities,50
and also in zoning matters.51
It may have been gathered, from this discussion of the meth-
ods for securing judicial review of administrative decisions, that
a single and uniform method of procedure would be highly de-
sirable. A step has been made in that direction by the adoption,
in 1945, of a new Administrative Review Act.52 It not only pro-
vides for one standard system of procedure, but also enlarges the
power of the trial court when passing upon the administrative
action.53 It likewise substitutes the ordinary civil procedure for
further review before the higher courts instead of the complica-
tions heretofore existing. There is one drawback; the act does
not have universal application but extends only to those admin-
istrative tribunals whose organic law has been amended to make
the new statute applicable thereto.54 It remains to be seen, there-
fore, whether the statute will meet with the approval of the bar.
46 Kingsbury v. Sperry, 119 Ill. 279, 10 N. E. 8 (1887); Superior Coal Co. v. Dept.
of Finance, 377 Ill. 282, 36 N. E. (2d) 354 (1941); Institute of Chiropody v.
Thompson, 386 Ill. 615, 55 N. E. (2d) 61 (1944).
47 Ekendahl v. Svolos, 388 Ill. 412, 58 N. E. (2d) 585 (1945), reversing 321 I1.
App. 457, 53 N. E. (2d) 302 (1944).
48 Loomis v. Hodson; 224 Ill. 147, 79 N. E. 590 (1906).
49 Wetaug Drain. Dist. v. I. C. R. R. Co., 297 Ill. 350, 130 N. E. 732 (1921).
5o People v. Emmerson, 294 Ill. 219, 128 N. E. 385 (1920).
51 Phelps v. Board of Appeals, 325 Ill. 625, 156 N. E. 826 (1927).
52 Laws 1945, p. 1144; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 264 et seq.
53 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 275.
54 Ibid., § 265.
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This discussion may be closed with the brief comment that
any study of the administrative process in action within a par-
ticular state will usually disclose that the problems presented,
and the disposition thereof, parallel closely those found in the
field of federal law. Where courts have found it necessary to
declare state administrative statutes or practices unconstitu-
tional, the decision has not been dictated by any thought that the
attempted legislation or action was socially undesirable but
rather because there has been found to exist a careless disregard
of fundamental doctrines. Closer attention thereto should result
in the shaping of a sounder body of law, for the administrative
system is unquestionably with us to stay.
